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Using a difference-in-differences framework, this paper estimates the impact that 
Britain‘s July 2005 bombings had on the labor market outcomes of UK residents who are either 
Muslim by religious affiliation or whose nativity profiles are similar to the terrorists. We find a 
10 percentage point decrease in the employment of very young Muslim men relative to non-
Muslim immigrants after the London bombings. The drop in employment is accompanied by 
consistent declines in real earnings and hours worked. A weak association between the 9-11 
terrorist attacks and a drop in the employment of very young male immigrants from Muslim-














I.  Introduction 
The 9-11 terrorists attacks, the March 2004 Madrid bombings, and the July 2005 London 
bombings (the bombings on 7
th July and the attempted bombings on July 21
st will be called the 
―July bombings‖ hereafter) served as a catalyst for an upsurge in anger and animosity toward 
Arabs and Muslims living in the United Kingdom.
1 These events triggered an increase in 
discrimination that existed prior to 9-11 and the July Bombings. 
The source of the pre-existing discrimination has been attributed to the resilient nature of 
Muslim religious identity, the slow pace of assimilation into the rest of British society, and the 
weaker soft skills (e.g., language) of Muslims. For example, Shields and Price (2003) find that 
even after accounting for differences in job-related characteristics, across the various ethnic 
minority migrant groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants are less successful in the labor 
market. This may be due to lower labor demand, especially for Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
women. 
Ameli et al. (2004) find from a pre 9-11 nationwide survey of 1,200 Muslims that 
Muslim women reported far greater discrimination than Muslim men (IHRC 1999, 2000).  After 
9/11, the gender difference in reported discrimination narrowed to 2 percentage points (men (78 
percent and women 80 percent). The targeting by police and security services of Muslim men 
appears to explain the narrowing. However, approximately 80 percent of employed Muslims 
reported incidences of discrimination in the workplace. Similar anti-Muslim responses occurred 
in the Netherlands and Denmark.
2 
There have been three studies that estimate the impact of the terrorist events‘ on the labor 
market outcomes of British Muslims. The evidence suggests no deterioration in the earnings and 
employment of Muslims can be attributed to the terrorist events. Braakmann (2007a) estimates  
 




difference-in-differences models using data from the British Labor force survey (LFS) to identify 
9-11‘s impacts, the beginning of the US involvement in Iraq, the Madrid train, and London 
bombings on the labor market outcomes of 16 to 64 year old UK Arab and Muslim men. 
Braakman finds that the terrorist attacks had no impact on the real wages, hours worked, and 
employment probabilities of Arab men. Braakmann (2007b) studies the effects of 9/11 on the re-
employment prospects of unemployed Arabs living in Germany, and also finds no change in 
employment prospects. 
Aslund and Rooth (2005) report that after 9/11, Swedish public attitude towards certain 
minorities changed. However, their analysis of detailed unemployment exit data on the entire 
Swedish working-age population reveals little evidence of relative changes in the unemployment 
exit or entry of the eight Muslim-looking minority groups. They conclude that employers behave 
rationally and do not respond to changes in attitudes toward immigrants as a group. 
This paper revisits the following questions. Did UK labor market outcomes become 
worse for Muslims and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries after 9/11 and after the July 
bombings? We revisit this question because we suspect that estimates based on the general or 
working age population mask the adverse impact that Muslim men who fit the age profile of the 
terrorists faced.  
Using the British LFS and a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology, we find that 9-
11 was associated with a relative decrease in the employment of 16 to 25 year old immigrant 
men from Muslim-majority countries or men who are Muslims by religious affiliation compared 
to other immigrants. A 10 percentage point decrease in the employment of very young Muslim 
men relative to non-Muslim immigrants occurred shortly after the London bombings. The drop 
in employment is accompanied by consistent declines in real earnings and hours worked. A weak  
 




association between the 9-11 terrorist attacks and a drop in the employment of very young male 
immigrants from Muslim-majority countries is also found. The terrorist events had little impact 
on the employment of older men.  
III.  Methods 
Our central method is difference-in-differences, where we compare the change in the 
employment-population ratio, hours worked per week, and real weekly earnings of a target group 
to that of a comparison group.
3 Thus, we attempt to remove the impact that labor supply, labor 
demand and institutional factors have on target group outcomes.
4 
More formally, outcomes for the ith person are described as follows: 
, u Trend β ) Muslim * (Region β
Region β ) Muslim * (Quarter β   Quarter  β ) Muslim * (Z β Z β
) Muslim * (X β X β ) Muslim * (After β   Muslim β After β β Y
irt t 12 irt r 11
r 10 irt t 9 8 irt rt 7 rt 6
irt irt 5 irt 4 irt t 3 irt 2 t 1 0 irt
  
    
     
                                                                                                                                                      
(1) 
where  irt Y  denotes the labor market outcome of person i in region r at time t,  t After  denotes a 
dummy variable that equals one if the observation comes from any month after a terrorist event 
(e.g., September 2001 or July 2005), and zero otherwise, and irt X  denotes a vector of individual 
characteristics that include potential experience, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, 
marital status, length of stay in the UK, and UK citizenship status. In our earnings equations, 
irt X contains occupation and industry variables.
5 
The term rt Z  represents quarterly regional unemployment rates, and t Quarter  contains a 
series of dummy variables that denote the interview quarter to capture seasonality, and  t Trend  is 
as a cubic function of time (starting from 1 for January 1999) to control for unmeasured, time-
varying influences.
6 The term Regionr denotes dummy variables that capture differential effects  
 




of geographic location. The coefficient 3   identifies the difference-in-differences effect of a 
terrorist event on the labor market outcomes of Muslims.
7  
Most of the effects are allowed to differ by Muslim status. This is done to allow for the 
fact that some factors, such as the business cycle and citizenship status, might have affected the 
two groups differently over time. There is a possibility that the amount of discrimination varied 
by location due to differences in the visibility of the target groups. However, other than using the 
regional dummies and Muslim to non-Muslim population ratios as an index of their visibility, no 
control is used for geographic variation.
8 
V.  Data and Results  
We use micro data from the British Quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) from 1999 to 
June 2007. In each year, we restrict the sample to men who at the time of the interview were 16 
to 54 years of age and were not enrolled in school.
9 The survey contains information on a 
person‘s nativity, which is used to identify whether an individual is from a Muslim-majority 
country. Also starting in spring 2002, the survey reports individuals‘ religious affiliations. The 
latter is probably better than nativity profiles for identifying the potential vulnerable groups. The 
two target groups are comprised of (a) first-generation male immigrants from Muslim-majority 
countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Other Middle Eastern 
countries except Israel) and (b) men living in the UK who reported that they are Muslim by 
religious affiliation.  It is important to note that the latter target group is larger in size, especially 
when men aged 16-25 are considered. Almost three-quarters (73 percent) of very young men 
from the Muslim-majority countries were actually Muslims by religion. However, only one-third 
of Muslim men were immigrants from Muslim-majority countries. This is because most young 
Muslims are UK-born.  
 




When constructing target and comparison groups, we consider the fact that 9-11‘s labor 
market impact might have varied by age. Given the typical terrorists profile, younger Muslims, 
Asians, and Arabs are more susceptible to fear and discrimination.
10 Young Muslim men might 
have experienced worse outcomes than older Muslim men. To operationalize these ideas, we 
estimate Equation (1) by age-groups. 
As most of the target groups are immigrants or their descendents, our preferred 
comparison groups are immigrants from non-Muslim majority countries. This is due to the fact 
that their socio-cultural backgrounds, soft-skills, and language proficiency are a better match 
than natives. The two comparison groups are immigrants from non-Muslim-majority countries 
and UK-born men.
11 After 2002, we use the religion and ethnicity information to construct the 
following comparison groups: non-Muslim Asian men, non-Muslim white men, non-Muslim 
British white men, and non-Muslims who are neither Asian nor white. 
 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our primary group of interest, 16 to 25 year old 
immigrants from Muslim-majority countries and their corresponding comparison groups. The 
target group members tend to reside in Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, Metropolitan West 
Midlands, Eastern, London, and South East - six of the U.K.‘s twelve regions. Eighty percent of 
the men in our sample live in these 6 regions. Table 1 suggests that from winter 1998 to summer 
2006, men in the target group have lower employment-population ratios, work fewer hours, and 
have lower weekly earnings than other immigrants and UK born men. The average length of stay 
in the UK of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries is 2.3 years greater than immigrants 
from other countries. Further, over one-half of Muslim immigrants, in contrast to 39 percent of 
the other immigrants, are UK citizens. A larger percentage of the target-group men are married.  
 




Even though marital status, years in the UK, and UK citizenship status should provide 
―Muslims‖ with greater economic advantages in the labor market, there are several demographic 
differences between Muslims and the immigrant comparison groups that offset the advantages 
associated with marriage, citizenship, and years in the United Kingdom.
12  
Immigrants from Muslim-majority countries have less education and work in lower 
paying industries and occupations. Among very young men, 26.0 percent of target-group 
members reported to have no qualification, compared to about 10.4 percent of their comparison-
group counterpart. Young target-group men are concentrated in manufacturing, hotel, restaurant 
and distribution industries, and sales, process and moving operations, and elementary 
occupations. Jobs in these industries and occupations tend to pay lower wages and are part-time 
in nature. Appendix I reports summary statistics that extend the upper age bounds to 29 and 54. 
Doing so has no impact on the previous conclusions. 
Appendix II reports summary statistics for 16 to 25 year old men, but uses the religious 
affiliation information to identify whether an individual is Muslim. The labor market outcomes 
are very similar across Muslim men and immigrant men from Muslim-majority countries. 
Eighteen percent of young Muslims are married in contrast to 9 percent of the immigrant 
comparison group. The proportion of Muslims with no qualification (16%) is higher for Muslims 
compared to the comparison group. For example, 27 percent of Muslims have ‗O‘ level or lower 
qualifications compared to 13 percent of immigrants from non-Muslim countries. 
Table 2 begins to reveal 9/11‘s impact on the employment-population ratio, hours worked 
and weekly earnings of young Muslim men. These basic statistics (non-regression adjusted) 
indicate that the employment-population ratio is the only labor market indicator of Muslims that 
the 9/11 and the London Bombings impacted. Also quite striking are the large earnings and  
 




employment gaps between Muslims and other immigrants. 
More specifically, the table shows that from January 1999 to August 2001, 16 to 25-year 
old Muslim men had employment-population ratios that differed very little from other 
immigrants: 2.4 percentage points lower. This disadvantage expanded to 12.0 percentage points 
from October 2001 to December 2002. To isolate 9/11‘s impact on employment-population 
ratios, the difference-in-differences estimates are constructed by taking the difference of these 
two estimates. Doing so generates a precisely estimated 9/11 disadvantage for young Muslim 
men of 9.5 percentage points. The disadvantage persists over time. In 2004, the DD estimate 
expands to 9.6 percentage points. Utilizing young UK born men (last column) as the control 
group also yields a disadvantage to Muslim men. Although large, the DD estimates of 6.3 and 
5.9 percentage points have less precision. The difference in outcomes among men between 16 
and 54 years of age, which are reported in Appendix I, remains unchanged.
13 
Table 2 also indicates that the July 2005 Bombings had an adverse impact on young 
Muslim employment-population ratios. Just prior to the bombings, Muslim men had a ratio that 
was 11.2 percentage points below other immigrants. The disadvantage expanded to 18.0 
percentage points. As a result, the DD estimate of the July bombing‘s impact on Muslim 
employment is 6.9 percentage points. The table shows no disadvantage associated with the 
bombing when Muslim men are compared to UK born men. The table presents evidence of a 
slight decline in the hours worked of young Muslim men associated with 9/11, with no further 
deterioration several years later. For the July Bombings, a seven-hour Muslim disadvantage is 
maintained through September 2006. For weekly earnings the most notable result is the 
substantial wage gap between Muslims and non-Muslims that exist prior to the terrorist attacks. 
The table provides little if any evidence that both terrorist events led to an expansion in the  
 




earnings gap between Muslim and other immigrants, and Muslims and UK born men. 
 Regression Results 
Before presenting the difference-in-differences estimates, we identify the sources of the 
large employment and earnings gaps between Muslims and other immigrants. To do this, we 
construct Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions of the employment and earning gaps between Muslims 
and other immigrants (UK born). The gaps are quite sizeable across age groups, which suggest 
that even older men might be susceptible to employment and earnings losses due to the terrorist 
events.  
The decompositions in Table 3 indicate that from 1999 to 2006, the employment of 
immigrants from Muslim countries is 11.3 to 14.8 percentage points lower than other 
immigrants. Approximately, 10 percentage points or 70 to 95 percent of this difference is 
unexplained.
14 For weekly earnings, a 39 to 54 percent gap exists, out of which 30 to 35 
percentage points are not explained by differences in education, potential experience, length of 
stay in the UK, citizenship, marital status, and regional labor market conditions. Panel B 
compares the employment and earnings of Muslim men to UK Born men. Large Muslim 
disadvantages persist across age for employment and earnings. Muslim employment is 17.6 to 
18.3 percent lower than UK Born men. Only 6.2 to 8.6 percentage points of the gap remains 
unexplained. The earnings gaps range from 25.2 to 47.5 percent. Here, less of the gap is 
explained. Education, potential experience, length of stay in the UK, citizenship, marital status, 
and regional labor market conditions explain 1.5 to 11.3 percentage points of the gaps that range 
from 25.2 to 47.5 percent. 
Table 4 reports regression-adjusted difference-in-differences effects of 9/11 and the July 
bombings on the employment, hours worked, and earnings of immigrants from Muslim-majority  
 




countries relative to other foreign-born immigrants (upper panel) and UK-born men (lower 
panel). For the youngest men (ages 16 to 25), some changes in outcomes associated with 9/11 are 
noticeable. Employment of young men from Muslim-majority countries fell by 9.3 percentage 
points compared to other immigrants. This relative decrease in employment is sustained through 
2004. Weekly hours worked also fall for young Muslim men. The decline persists through 2004. 
Relative to other immigrants, the weekly earnings of young Muslim men increased after 9/11 by 
22.0 and 25.0 percent. A potential explanation for this counter intuitive result is that after 9/11 
young Muslim men concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution lost their jobs, 
pushing the group‘s post-9/11 mean earnings upward. To check for this possibility, we estimated 
our models, where we exclude men who have no educational qualifications. No significant 
difference-in-differences effects on employment and earnings are found when the sample was 
restricted.
15 This is consistent with the hypothesis that the event was associated with a decrease 
in the employment of young ―Muslims‖ who have no qualifications (and therefore are in the 
lower tail of earnings distribution). 
The table shows that when we extend the sample to older workers, the adverse impacts on 
employment and hours quickly dissipate. We find little if any impact among 16 to 29 year old 
men, and no impact among 16 to 54 year old men, providing confirmation for our identification 
strategy. 
When the UK-born men are used as the comparison group (Table 4), we find no 
statistically significant deterioration in the employment and earnings of immigrants from 
Muslim-majority countries after the July bombings. However, it should be noted that when all of 
the target-group members are immigrants, estimates using UK-born men as the comparison 
group are less reliable due to unobservable and unmeasured differences in characteristics such as  
 




language proficiency and other ―soft‖ skills for which we do not have measures. The second 
comparison group includes both white Muslims and 2
nd generation immigrants from Muslim-
majority countries causing a potential downward bias in our estimate. News reports published 
after 9/11 indicate that white Muslims as well as the 2
nd generation Muslim immigrants 
experienced animosity after the terrorist events.
16 Besides, there are fewer explanatory variables 
in the regressions that use the UK-born men as the comparison group. Measures for citizenship 
and length of stay are excluded to avoid multi-collinearity when all UK-born men are used as the 
comparison group. 
The July bombings did not have any impact on the labor market outcomes of immigrants 
from Muslim-majority countries. Appendix III shows that there was no statistically significant 
association between the July bombings and the labor market outcomes of immigrants from 
Muslim-majority countries compared to other immigrants or UK-natives. 
  Since spring 2002, the LFS contains information on an individual‘s religious affiliation. 
This may be a better proxy for establishing Muslim identity than using country of origin 
(Muslim-majority country). We use this source of variation to create a new target group to 
estimate the effect of the July Bombings on Muslim outcomes. Table 5 reports changes in 
Muslim men‘s outcomes compared to non-Muslims after the July bombings. The difference-in-
differences estimates in the upper panel use non-Muslim immigrants as the comparison group 
while the lower panel uses UK-born non-Muslim men. The ―Basic‖ model reproduces the 
estimates in Table 2, the unadjusted means. The ―Full‖ model adds our list of characteristics. 
Among 16 to 25 year old men, the Muslim employment-population ratio dropped by 10.3 
percentage points compared to non-Muslim immigrants in the two years following July 2005. 
Their relative weekly hours declined by 4.5 to 6.6 hours and weekly earnings fell by up to 32.5  
 




percent. The relative decline in hours is consistent with the decrease in employment-population 
ratio. 
  As we increase the upper bound on age from 25 to 29 and then to 54, the DD estimates 
for the employment-population ratio and earnings of young Muslim men either dampen or 
become insignificant. Small reductions in weekly hours worked remain at older ages. We find 
very little difference in outcomes of Muslim men and all UK-born men, consistent with our view 
that we are unable to fully capture the hetereogeneity in the sample when native-born men are 
used for comparison. 
VI.   Robustness of Results 
Our findings that the employment of very young ―Muslim‖ men deteriorated after both 
terrorist events can be questioned on several grounds. First, during the post-9/11 years, the 
relative decline in the employment-population ratio of some groups of young ―Muslims‖ was 
accompanied by a relative increase in their average earnings. Second, the validity of comparison 
groups can always be questioned.  
We address the first critique by estimating the earnings regression with a restricted 
sample. To ensure that our identification strategy is capturing the terrorist event‘s impacts on 
labor market outcomes, we use pseudo-intervention dates in the DD estimation. To address 
concern about the comparability of the target and control groups, we explore whether our results 
are sensitive to the use additional comparison groups. 
As mentioned earlier, there was a 22.0 to 25.0 percentage-point relative increase in the 
weekly earnings of young men from Muslim-majority countries increased after 9/11. However, 
we find no significant difference-in-differences effects on employment and earnings when we 
restrict the sample to men without higher education.
17 This is consistent with the hypothesis that  
 




9/11 was associated with a decrease in employment of mainly those young ―Muslims‖ who have 
low qualifications and therefore are in the lower tail of earnings distribution.
18 
Findings from using Different Intervention Dates 
  As an identification check, we incorrectly specify the timing of the 9/11 attacks and 
bombings. To do this, we estimate the difference-in-differences models with pseudo intervention 
dates. Using a range of dates from 2003 to 2007, we find that the most statistically significant 
decrease in young Muslim employment occurred after June 2005, the time of the London 
bombings. The employment-population ratio of young Muslims in the post-March 2005 and the 
post-June 2005 data fell by 11 percentage points, with the estimate being significant at 5 percent 
level. 
Table 6 reports the difference-in-differences estimates for young Muslims using June 
2004 as the intervention date. The regressions are based on data from January 2003 through June 
2005. The upper panel compares Muslims to non-Muslim immigrants and the lower panel 
compares Muslims to non-Muslim minority men who are neither white nor black. As 
hypothesized, all of the coefficients are small and none are measured with precision. Table 7 
shows difference-in-differences estimates for the employment-ratio using a range of intervention 
dates between years 1999 and 2004.  Several of these intervention dates, including 9-11, are 
associated with statistically significant decrease in employment of men from Muslim-majority 
countries. This indicates a lack of robustness of our previous finding on 9-11‘s effect on the 
employment of young men from Muslim-majority countries.  
  Tables 8 and 9 present evidence that supports the robustness of our earlier results for 
young UK men who are Muslim by religious affiliation. Using a range of dates between 2003 
and 2007, we find that the most statistically significant relative decrease in the employment of  
 




young Muslims occurred after June 2005. Table 8 shows approximately an 11 percentage point 
drop (significant at 5% level) in the employment of young Muslims in the post-March 2005 and 
the post-June 2005 data. Table 9 reports difference-in-differences estimates for three windows of 
time. Each window contains 24 consecutive months starting from July and ending in June and 
the 12
th month is used as the intervention date for estimating difference-in-differences in the 
employment of young Muslims. By selecting time-spans and intervention dates in such a way, 
we potentially keep the seasonal effects similar across the pre- and the post-event months. One 
would also expect the business cycle movement to be moderate in a 24-month window. The 
difference-in-differences effect is statistically significant only for the July 2005 model (column 
2, Table 9). A statistically significant 11 percentage-point decrease in Muslim occurred. These 
results are consistent with our earlier findings that the erosion in the outcomes associated with 
9/11 and the July bombings were short-lived. 
VII.  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper estimates the impacts of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the London bombings 
on the employment-population ratio, hours worked, and earnings of UK minority men who fit 
Muslim stereotypes. Using a natural experiment framework, we find a decrease in the 
employment-population ratio of 16 to 25 year-old Muslim men after the July bombings relative 
to their non-Muslim counterparts. There is little persistence over time in the disadvantage‘s 
growth. Similar to previous research, we find no decline among older Muslim men. 
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of an emergence in discrimination against 
minorities that fit societal stereotypes of young Muslims. Furthermore, the fear of discrimination 
made it harder for young minority workers to join and remain in the labor market. We have 
found that after the July bombings young men who are Muslim by religious affiliation  
 




experienced declines in their employment whereas young men who are immigrants from 
Muslim-majority countries did not experience this decrease. 
Even though we only find that very young Muslims are affected by the terrorist attacks, 
the result has important implications for the future. Today, the average age of UK‘s Muslim men 
is approximately 28 years—13 years less than the national average. Over one third of UK 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are under 16, the youngest age cohort in the country. Given the very 
different age profiles of ethnic minorities and UK natives, a significant part of the future growth 
in the working age population between 1999 and 2009 is forecast to come from these minorities, 
and it is evident that the youngest age cohort of Muslim workers are far from well-integrated in 
the UK labor market.
 19   
The slower Muslim integration and assimilation into British society might have mutually 
reinforced the impact that the terrorist events had on their labor market outcomes. Given the 
faster growth in the population of young UK minority workers, future terrorist activities may 
affect these groups more widely. To minimize these potential impacts, there must be a greater 
focus on reducing the persistent employment and earnings gaps that predated the 9/11 and 
London Bombings.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for 16 to 25 Year Old Men 
Variables  “Muslims” Other Immigrants Difference        UK-Born  Difference 
Employment (%)  62.04  73.00  -10.96      80.34  -18.3 
Observations  1,386  4,433        57,560   
Hours Worked  21.86  28.92  -7.06      31.16  -9.31 
Observations  1,254  3,989        51,694   
Weekly Earnings (Pounds)   223.50  325.17  -101.67      283.55  -60.05 
Observations  196  755        11,157   
Age  22.33  22.31  0.05      21.26  1.07* 
UK Citizen (%)  51.77  39.08  12.69*      1.00  50.36* 
Married  (%)  30.86  11.33  19.85*      4.32  26.54* 
Length of stay in UK (Years)  10.01  7.60  2.31*      21.26  -11.25 
Educational Qualification (%)               
No Qualification  26.01  10.42  15.42*      10.88  15.13* 
Foreign Education  23.81  36.21  -12.16      2.28  21.53* 
O-Level or Below  23.00  16.56  6.23*      41.17  -18.18 
A level or Diploma Equivalent  13.30  19.72  -6.43      30.23  -16.94 
Bachelor's or Higher  11.54  15.24  -3.58      14.16  -2.63 
Missing Value  2.35  1.85  0.52      1.27  1.08* 
Industry (%)               
Agriculture & Fishing  0.00  0.91  -0.91      1.48  -1.48 
Energy & Water  0.85  0.22  0.14      0.85  -0.52 
Manufacturing  22.97  10.24  13.25*      16.81  6.16* 
Construction  1.95  9.48  -8.06      13.80  -11.85 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants  38.25  31.19  8.07*      26.79  11.46* 
Transport & Communication  13.76  7.75  5.65*      6.98  6.78* 
Banking, Finance & Insurance  13.22  22.12  -9.19      19.03  -5.81 
Public Admin, Education & Health  4.77  9.83  -5.20      7.92  -3.15 
Other Services  6.31  8.22  -3.72      6.31  -1.55 
Workplace Outside UK  0.00  0.03  -0.03      0.03  -0.03 
Occupation (%)               
Managers and Senior Officials  7.13  8.60  -2.83      7.13  -1.54 
Professional  6.75  8.63  -3.70      6.75  -1.49 
Associate Professional and Technical  7.46  15.07  -8.10      13.01  -5.55 
Administrative and Secretarial  6.80  8.82  -1.49      11.37  -4.57 
Skilled Trades  8.88  12.64  -4.10      22.50  -13.62 
Personal Service  4.83  7.38  -2.21      3.95  0.87 
Sales and Customer Service  15.02  9.43  6.32*      10.64  4.38* 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  15.13  7.41  7.98*      8.88  6.26* 
Elementary/Other  31.03  22.03  8.14*      15.78  15.25* 
Source: British Labour Force Survey Quarterly Files Winter 1998 to Summer 2006. 
Notes: ―Muslim‖ refers to immigrant men from Muslim-majority countries. Differences in means are shown with statistical 
significances where ―*‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at 
the 10% level.  Summary statistics for 16 to 29 and 16 to 54 year old men are located in Appendix Table I.  
 





Table 2: Outcomes for 16 to 25 Year Old Men Pre and Post-9/11 and the July Bombings  
by Target and Comparison Groups 






Immigrants  UK-born 
UK-Born-Muslim 
Immigrants 
9/11 Effect                 
Jan.99 to Aug.01  71.08  73.51  2.43  82.24  11.16 
Oct.01*to*Dec.02  63.92  75.87  11.95  81.34  17.42 
DD Estimate       -9.52*    -6.26 
Oct.01 to Dec.04  62.96  75.00  12.04  80.05  17.09 
DD Estimate       -9.61**    -5.93 
July Bombing Effect           
Jan.04 to Jun.05  62.63  73.78  11.15  79.78  17.15 
Aug.05 to Sept.06  60.79  78.82  18.03  77.23  16.44 
DD Estimate       -6.88+    0.71 
Panel B: Hours Worked                
9/11 Effect           
Jan.99 to Aug.01  23.82  28.05  4.23  31.86  8.04 
Oct.01 to Dec.02  21.18  28.39  7.21  30.82  9.64 
DD Estimate      -2.98    -1.60 
Oct.01 to Dec.04  21.16  28.05  6.89  30.25  9.09 
DD Estimate      -2.66    -1.05 
Jan.04 to Jun.05  22.41  29.66  7.25  31.04  8.63 
Aug.05 to Sept.06  25.21  32.34  7.13  32.30  7.09 
DD Estimate      0.12    1.54 
Panel C: Weekly Earnings                
Jan.99 to Aug.01  185.02  322.76  137.74  269.64  131.90 
Oct.01 to Dec.02  243.07  334.42  91.35  296.44  205.09 
DD Estimate      46.39    -73.19 
Oct.01 to Dec.04  246.31  328.81  82.50  294.41  48.10 
DD Estimate      55.24    83.80 
Jan.04 to Jun.05  266.28  302.69  36.41  302.49  36.21 
Aug.05 to Sept.06  252.77  324.33  71.56  292.11  39.34 
DD Estimate      -35.15    -3.13 
Source: British Labour Force Survey Quarterly Files Winter 1998 to Summer 2006. 
Notes:  Muslims  are  identified  by  religious  affiliation.  Differences  in  means  are  shown  with  statistical  significances  where  ―*‖  denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level.   
  
 




Table 3: Oaxaca Decompositions of Employment and Earning Gaps  
Panel A: Relative to Other Immigrants   Employment-Population Ratio    Log Weekly Earnings 
Effect  16-25  16-29  16-54    16-25  16-29  16-54 
Total Gap  0.113**  0.132**  0.148**     0.391**  0.520**  0.539** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)    (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Explained Gap  0.005  0.026**  0.040**    0.094**  0.160**  0.213** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)    (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Residual Gap  0.109**  0.106**  0.108**    0.297**  0.360**  0.325** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)     (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
  5975  12465  50566    995  2239  8899 
Panel B: Relative to UK Born Men               
Total Gap  0.181**  0.176**  0.183**    0.252**  0.377**  0.475** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Explained Gap  0.119**  0.089**  0.064**    0.015  0.057+  0.113** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Residual Gap  0.062*  0.086**  0.120**    0.237**  0.319**  0.362** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)    (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
  79597  127899  510104    15349  26413  110859 
Notes: The employment gap models include all men where as the gap in log weekly earnings include only employed men. The samples in the upper 
panel consist of only 1
st generation immigrants from (1) other countries and (2) Muslim-majority countries (Bangladesh Morocco Egypt Pakistan Iran 
Other-Middle-East Iraq Lebanon). The lower panel shows decompositions of the gaps between the latter group and UK-born men. The time period runs 
from Winter 1999 to Fall 2006. Coefficients are shown with statistical significances where ―**‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―*‖ 
denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level. Robust standard Errors clustered by repeated 
observations are shown in parentheses. Explanatory variables are potential experience, potential experience squared, years of education, citizenship, 
marital status, the regional unemployment rate and ratios of the two groups‘  population across regions.  
 




Table 4: Difference-in-differences effects of 9-11 on Labor Market Outcomes of Men 
from Muslim-Majority Countries 
 
Dec. 1999 through Dec. 2002 with Sept.2001 as Intervention Date  
Dec. 1999 through Dec. 2004 with Sept.2001 as Intervention Date  
 
    Ages 16-25  Ages 16-29  Ages  16-54 
Relative to Other Immigrants  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
 
Employed=1  -0.095+  -0.092+  -0.06  -0.03  -0.021  -0.006 
  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.020) 
Observations  2818  2818  5718  5718  23306  23306 
Weekly Hours Worked  -3.272  -3.647  -2.583  -1.053  -1.558  -0.478 
  (2.540)  (2.383)  (1.892)  (1.745)  (1.087)  (0.999) 
Observations  2615  2615  5314  5314  21247  21247 
Log Weekly Earnings  0.128  0.279  0.101  0.176  -0.028  -0.002 
  (0.138)  (0.171)  (0.110)  (0.114)  (0.071)  (0.060) 
Observations  505  505  1073  1073  4222  4222 
Relative to All UK-Born Men             
 
Employed=1  -0.053  -0.033  -0.037  -0.008  -0.014  0.002 
  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Observations  38929  38929  63446  63446  238659  238659 
Weekly Hours Worked  -1.495  -1.45  -1.154  -0.093  -1.077  -0.037 
  (2.168)  (2.038)  (1.657)  (1.532)  (0.971)  (0.894) 
Observations  35791  35791  58167  58167  216146  216146 
Log Weekly Earnings  0.105  0.193  0.128  0.176+  0.01  0.03 
  (0.120)  (0.148)  (0.100)  (0.106)  (0.066)  (0.058) 
    8040  8040  13917  13917  53926  53926 
    Ages 16-25  Ages 16-29  Ages  16-54 
Relative to Other Immigrants  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
 
Employed=1  -0.096*  -0.094*  -0.053  -0.057+  -0.022  -0.017 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
Observations  4203  4203  8703  8703  35551  35551 
Weekly Hours Worked  -3.365  -3.577+  -2.191  -2.172  -1.374  -0.766 
  (2.083)  (2.020)  (1.552)  (1.512)  (0.898)  (0.853) 
Observations  3924  3924  8111  8111  32449  32449 
Log Weekly Earnings  0.231*  0.255+  0.141  0.169+  0.018  0.028 
  (0.113)  (0.131)  (0.088)  (0.092)  (0.058)  (0.050) 
Observations  733  733  1602  1602  6357  6357 
Relative to All UK-Born Men             
 
Employed=1  -0.058  -0.052  -0.021  -0.022  -0.005  0 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Observations  57649  57649  92370  92370  352820  352820 
Weekly Hours Worked  -1.322  -1.69  -0.181  -0.341  -0.408  0.078 
  (1.747)  (1.687)  (1.341)  (1.312)  (0.801)  (0.768) 
Observations  52990  52990  84712  84712  319538  319538 
Log Weekly Earnings  0.175+  0.212+  0.132+  0.154+  0.016  0.018 
  (0.097)  (0.115)  (0.080)  (0.085)  (0.054)  (0.047) 
    11621  11621  19817  19817  78717  78717 
Notes: Entries are the coefficients of the interaction between the Muslim dummy variable and Post-9/11 dummy variable. All 
estimates are from OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by groups and years are shown in parentheses. Robust 
Standard Errors clustered by persons are shown in parentheses. The level of statistical significance are indicated as follows: ―*‖ 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level.     
 




Table 5: Effects of July Bombings on Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men 
Between 1










    16-25  16-29  16-54 
Relative to Other Immigrants  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
 
Employed=1  -0.137**  -0.103*  -0.042  -0.024  -0.028+  -0.026 
  (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Observations  4396  4396  8477  8477  29826  29826 
Weekly Hours Worked  -6.627**  -4.469*  -2.712*  -1.525  -1.866*  -1.724+ 
  (1.757)  (2.031)  (1.301)  (1.523)  (0.772)  (0.892) 
Observations  4124  4124  7875  7875  27341  27341 
Log Weekly Earnings  -0.190+  -0.325*  0.06  -0.023  0.059  0.032 
  (0.111)  (0.137)  (0.088)  (0.107)  (0.061)  (0.068) 
Observations  642  642  1424  1424  5062  5062 
Relative to All UK-Born Men             
 
Employed=1  -0.054+  -0.048  0.009  0.007  -0.007  -0.002 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Observations  37016  37016  57850  57850  235565  235565 
Weekly Hours Worked  -2.424+  -2.787+  0.276  -0.215  -0.705  -0.448 
  (1.32)  (1.51)  (1.06)  (1.23)  (0.67)  (0.77) 
Observations  33991  33991  53003  53003  213003  213003 
Log Weekly Earnings  -0.045  -0.173+  0.122+  0.043  0.037  0.041 
  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Observations  6417  6417  10932  10932  48593  48593 
Notes: Entries are estimated coefficients of the interaction between Muslim dummy and ―post-July 2005‖ dummy. All results 
shown were given by OLS regressions. All variables except log weekly earning, hours worked, age, length-of-stay and local 
unemployment rate are categorical. Log earnings models include only employed men. In the hours worked models, hours are set 
equal to zero if not employed. Standard errors clustered by ―persons‖ are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are shown with 
statistical significances where ―**‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―*‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes 
significance at the 10% level.  
 




Table 6: Difference-in-Differences in Labor Market Outcomes of Muslims when June 
2004 is Used as an Intervention Date 
    16-25  16-29  16-54 
Relative to Other Immigrants  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
  Employed=1  0.026  0.016  0.005  -0.015  0.002  -0.011 
    (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
  Observations  2655  2655  5157  5157  18897  18897 
  Weekly Hours Worded  0.092  -0.439  -0.476  -1.297  0.063  -0.605 
    (2.090)  (2.077)  (1.563)  (1.536)  (0.915)  (0.867) 
  Observations  2494  2494  4807  4807  17343  17343 
  Log Weekly Earnings  0.043  -0.006  0.105  0.051  0.087  0.034 
    (0.126)  (0.136)  (0.100)  (0.096)  (0.066)  (0.063) 
  Observations  394  394  852  852  3222  3222 
Relative to All Minorities (Except Black)             
  Employed=1  0.021  0.025  0.007  0.02  0  0.007 
    (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
  Observations  3055  3055  5027  5027  16092  16092 
  Weekly Hours Worked  0.306  0.827  -0.386  0.536  -0.112  0.28 
    (1.950)  (1.921)  (1.603)  (1.560)  (0.956)  (0.898) 
  Observations  2837  2837  4644  4644  14817  14817 
  Log Weekly Earnings  -0.102  -0.111  -0.054  -0.05  -0.009  -0.01 
    (0.127)  (0.137)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.068)  (0.064) 
  Observations  392  392  709  709  2548  2548 
Notes: All regressions use data from January 2003 through June 2005. Entries are estimated coefficients of 
the interaction between Muslim dummy and ―post-July 2004‖ dummy. All results shown were estimated 
with OLS. All variables except log weekly earning, hours worked, age, length-of-stay and local 
unemployment rate are categorical. Log earnings models include only employed men. In the hours worked 
models, hours are set equal to zero if not employed. Standard errors clustered by ―persons‖ are shown in 
parentheses.  Coefficients are shown with statistical significances where ―**‖ denotes significance at the 











Table 7: Difference-in-differences Effects on Employment  
of Young Men from Muslim-majority Countries 
Dates  D-D Estimate 
Sept.1999  -0.146* 
Dec.1999  -0.161** 
Mar.2000  -0.183** 
Jun.2000  -0.190** 
Sept.2000  -0.153** 
Dec.2000  -0.126* 
Mar.2001  -0.102* 
Jun.2001  -0.088+ 
Sept.2001  -0.086+ 
Dec.2001  -0.102* 
Mar.2002  -0.083+ 
Jun.2002  -0.060 
Sept.2002  -0.068 
Dec.2002  -0.053 
Mar.2003  -0.060 
Notes: Each regression includes 4,282 observations between 
1999 and 2004. All estimates are from OLS regressions. 
Robust Standard Errors clustered by groups and years are 
shown in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors clustered by 
persons are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are shown 
with statistical significances where ―**‖ denotes significance 
at the 1% level, ―*‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and 
―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Table 8: DD Effects on Employment of Young Muslim Men 
Date  D-D Estimate 
Jun-04  -0.049 
Sep-04  -0.089+ 
Dec-04  -0.090+ 
Mar-05  -0.119* 
Jun-05  -0.111* 
Sep-05  -0.098* 
Dec-05  -0.074+ 
Mar-06  -0.009 
Jun-06  -0.010 
Notes: Each regression uses 4233 observations between Spring 2003 and Autumn 
2007. All estimates are from OLS regressions. Robust Standard Errors clustered 
by groups and years are shown in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors clustered 
by persons are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are shown with statistical 
significances where ―**‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―*‖ denotes 
















Table 9: Difference-in-Differences in Employment of Young Muslim Men  
Between Paired Years 
 
Between the years  
before and after June 2004 
  Between the years  
before and after June 2005 
  Between the years  
before and after June 2006 
Period  After June 2004    After July 2005    After July 2006 
Difference-in-Differences  -0.045    -0.117*    0.022 
Standard Error  (0.048)    (0.055)    (0.052) 
Observations  2128    2669    2572 
Notes: Target Group: 16 to 25 Year Old Muslim Men; Comparison Group: 16 to 25 Year Old Non-Muslim Immigrant men. All 
estimates are from OLS regressions. Robust Standard Errors clustered by groups and years are shown in parentheses. Robust 
Standard Errors clustered by persons are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are shown with statistical significances where ―**‖ 



























Appendix I: Summary Statistics for 16 to 29 Year Old Men from Muslim-majority 
Countries and the Comparison-Group Men 
Variables  Muslims  Other Immigrants Difference        UK-Born  Difference 
Employment  67.5  80.5  -13**      84.6  -17.1** 
Observations  3044  9264        123143   
Hours Worked  23.5  32.2  -8.7**      33.5  -10** 
Observations  2864  8605        112672   
Weekly Earnings (Dollars)  251  412  -161**      345  -94** 
Observations  437  1781        25605   
Age  25  25.1  -0.1      23.6  1.4** 
UK Citizen (%)  48.5  28.5  20**      100  -51.5** 
Married  (%)  47  21  26**      11.7  35.3** 
Length of stay in UK (Years)  20.8  23.8  -3**      23.6  -2.8** 
Educational Qualification (%)               
No Qualification  25  7  18**      8.7  16.3** 
Foreign Education  25  35  -10**      2.6  22.4** 
O-Level or Below  15  10  5**      33.3  -17.7** 
Missing Value  9  10  -1+      8.5  0.5 
A level or Diploma Equivalent  13  17  -4**      29.5  -16.5** 
Bachelor's or Higher  13  20  -7**      17.4  -4.4** 
Industry (%)               
Agriculture & Fishing  .47  0.75  0      1.24  -0.77 
Energy & Water  0.94  0.46  0      1.06  -0.12 
Manufacturing  25.71  13.42  12.3**      19.76  5.95** 
Construction  1.89  5.16  -3**      9.96  -8.07** 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants  34.91  24.37  10.5**      22.43  12.48** 
Transport & Communication  10.38  7.17  3*      8.12  2.26+ 
Banking, Finance & Insurance  13.44  25.97  -12.5**      20.49  -7.05** 
Public Admin, Education & Health  8.96  15.60  -6.6**      11.87  -2.91+ 
Other Services  3.30  7.05  -3.7**      5.06  -1.76+ 
Workplace Outside UK  0.00  0.06  0      0  0 
Occupation (%)               
Managers and Senior Officials  4.95  11.46  -6.51**      10.63  -5.68** 
Professional  7.55  17.25  -9.70**      11.48  -3.93* 
Associate Professional and Technical  8.49  19.77  -11.28      14.89  -6.4** 
Administrative and Secretarial  8.49  7.97  -0.52      10.42  -1.93 
Skilled Trades  11.79  8.94  2.85+      18.68  -6.89** 
Personal Service  4.48  5.96  -1.48      3.98  0.5 
Sales and Customer Service  10.61  6.3  4.30**      7.96  2.65+ 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  17.22  6.13  11.85**      9.35  7.87** 
Elementary/Other  26.42  16.22  10.20**      12.6  13.82** 
Source: British Labour Force Survey Quarterly Files Winter 1998 to Summer 2006. 
Notes: Differences in means are shown with statistical significances where ―*‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes 








Appendix I cont.: Summary Statistics for 16 to 54 Year Old Men from Muslim-
majority Countries and Comparison-Group Men 
Variables  Muslims  Other Immigrants Difference        UK-Born  Difference 
Employment  70.34  85.07  -14.73**      88.5  -18.16** 
Observations  12350  37605        491102   
Hours Worked  25.72  35.76  -10.04**      37.12  -11.4** 
Observations  11371  34281        443825   
Weekly Earnings (Dollars)  373  575  -202**      509.2  -136.2** 
Observations  1629  7174        107762   
Age  36  36  0      37.3  -1.3** 
UK Citizen (%)  62.6  43.9  18.7**      100  -37.4** 
Married  (%)  71.8  51.5  21.2**      47.4  24.4** 
Length of stay in UK (Years)  20.7  20.9  -0.2      37.2  -16.5** 
Educational Qualification (%)               
No Qualification  26.94  8.06  18.8**      9.63  17.31** 
Foreign Education  26.61  29.69  -3.08**      5.33  21.28** 
O-Level or Below  10.09  9.06  1.03**      23.64  -13.55** 
Missing Value  9.47  10.04  -.56+      8.88  0.59* 
A level or Diploma Equivalent  11.26  20.78  -9.52**      33.88  -22.62** 
Bachelor's or Higher  15.64  22.37  -6.73**      18.63  -2.99** 
Industry (%)               
Agriculture & Fishing  0.13  .71  -0.58**      0.97  -0.84** 
Energy & Water  0.25  0.64  -0.39+      1.49  -1.24** 
Manufacturing  24.48  15.85  8.63**      23.93  0.55** 
Construction  1.76  4.94  -3.18**      8.7  -6.94** 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants  32.41  17.6  14.81**      14.85  17.56** 
Transport & Communication  9.88  9.91  -0.03**      10.83  -0.95 
Banking, Finance & Insurance  14.03  24.67  -10.64**      17.92  -3.89** 
Public Admin, Education & Health  14.22  20.01  -5.79**      17.06  -2.84** 
Other Services  2.83  5.48  -2.65**      4.22  -1.39* 
Workplace Outside UK  0  0.17  -0.17+      0  0 
Occupation (%)               
Managers and Senior Officials  13.4  21.01  -7.61**      22.07  -8.67** 
Professional  14.72  20.58  -5.86**      14.01  0.71 
Associate Professional and Technical  9.18  15.49  -6.31**      13.94  -4.76** 
Administrative and Secretarial  5.91  6.35  -0.44      6.36  -0.45 
Skilled Trades  13.08  9.99  3.09**      15.72  -2.64** 
Personal Service  4.72  4.34  0.38      3.34  1.38** 
Sales and Customer Service  6.23  3.59  2.64**      3.75  2.48** 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  17.36  7.32  10.04**      11.91  5.45** 
Elementary/Other  15.41  11.34  4.07**      8.89  6.52** 
Source: British Labour Force Survey Quarterly Files Winter 1998 to Summer 2006. 
Notes: Differences in means are shown with statistical significances where ―*‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes 










Appendix II: Summary Statistics for 16 to 25 Year Old Muslim Men and  
Comparison-Group Men 
Variables  Muslims 
Non-Muslim 
Immigrants  Difference       
Non-
Muslim 
UK-Born  Difference 
Employment (%)  60.3  75.8  -15.5**      80.4  -20.1** 
Observations  2004  2826        46011   
Hours Worked  20.6  29.1  -8.5**      30.3  -9.7** 
Observations  1872  2655        42220   
Weekly Earnings (Pounds)   246.4  328.3  -81.95**      287.2  -40.8** 
Observations  249  470        8476   
Age  22  22.5  -0.5**      21.3  0.7** 
UK Citizen (%)  73.5  28.9  44.6**      100  -26.5** 
Married  (%)  18.4  9.2  9.2**      3.7  14.7** 
Length of stay in UK (Years)  16.3  7.2  9.1**      21.3  -5** 
Educational Qualification (%)               
No Qualification  16.67  9.31  7.3**      9.45  7.2** 
Foreign Education  10.68  32.17  -21.5**      2.12  8.5** 
O-Level or Below  27.30  13.02  14.3**      36.3  -9** 
Missing Value (Put after Bachelor‘s)  17.61  15.68  1.9+      13.37  4.2** 
A level or Diploma Equivalent  14.27  17.52  -3.2**      27.44  -13.2** 
Bachelor's or Higher  13.47  12.31  1.15      11.33  2.1** 
Industry (%)               
Agriculture & Fishing  0  1.28  -1.28+      1.24  -1.24+ 
Energy & Water  2.01  0.64  1.37+      0.98  1.03 
Manufacturing  22.89  12.37  10.52**      17.26  5.63* 
Construction  2.81  5.97  -3.16+      12.64  -9.83** 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants  36.55  32.84  3.71      26.82  9.73** 
Transport & Communication  8.03  4.9  3.13+      6.93  1.1 
Banking, Finance & Insurance  20.48  20.47  0.01      17.53  2.95 
Public Admin, Education & Health  6.02  14.29  -8.27**      10.76  -4.74* 
Other Services  1.2  7.25  -6.05**      5.84  -4.64** 
Workplace Outside UK  0  0        0  0 
Occupation (%)               
Managers and Senior Officials  3.61  5.33  -1.72      6.72  -3.11 
Professional  5.62  11.09  -5.47*      8.26  -2.64+ 
Associate Professional and Technical  9.24  18.12  -8.88**      13.6  -4.36 
Administrative and Secretarial  9.24  6.4  2.84      9.94  -0.7* 
Skilled Trades  9.64  12.15  -2.51      21.35  -11.71 
Personal Service  1.2  4.48  -3.28*      2.5  -1.3** 
Sales and Customer Service  20.08  10.66  9.42**      10.46  9.62 
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives  12.05  7.46  4.59*      8.64  3.41** 
Elementary/Other  29.32  24.31  5.01      18.54  10.78+ 
Source: British Labour Force Survey Quarterly Files Winter 1998 to Summer 2006. 
Notes: Differences in means are shown with statistical significances where ―*‖ denotes significance at the 1% level, ―**‖ denotes 
significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level.  Summary statistics for 16 to 29 and 16 to 54 year old men 
are located in Appendix Table I.  
 



















    16-25  16-29  16-54 
Relative to Other Immigrants  Basic  Full  Basic  Full  Basic  Full 
 
Employed=1  -0.067  -0.03  -0.002  0.037  -0.006  -0.007 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Observations  3125  3125  6709  6709  26812  26812 
Weekly Hours Worked  -2.876  -1.038  -0.409  1.089  -0.553  -0.478 
  (2.52)  (2.76)  (1.68)  (1.99)  (0.90)  (1.05) 
Observations  2939  2939  6237  6237  24514  24514 
Log Weekly Earnings  -0.138  -0.176  0.027  -0.04  0.001  0.037 
  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.09) 
Observations  510  510  1213  1213  4718  4718 
Relative to All UK-Born Men             
 
Employed=1  0.003  0.006  0.039  0.056  0.014  0.014 
  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Observations  29026  29026  45164  45164  181562  181562 
Weekly Hours Worked  0.993  0.072  2.284  2.34  0.64  0.818 
  (2.20)  (2.33)  (1.49)  (1.75)  (0.82)  (0.95) 
Observations  26661  26661  41393  41393  164182  164182 
Log Weekly Earnings  -0.009  0.038  0.079  0.07  -0.029  0.077 
  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Observations  5130  5130  8661  8661  37771  37771 
Notes: All regressions include data from 1
st quarter of 2004 through 2
nd quarter of 2007. Entries are estimated coefficients of the 
interaction between Muslim dummy and ―post-July 2005‖ dummy. All results shown were given by OLS regressions. All variables 
except log weekly earning, hours worked, age, length-of-stay and local unemployment rate are categorical. Log earnings models 
include only employed men. In the hours worked models, hours are set equal to zero if not employed. Standard errors clustered by 
―persons‖ are shown in parentheses.  Coefficients are shown with statistical significances where ―**‖ denotes significance at the 
1% level, ―*‖ denotes significance at the 5% level, and ―+‖ denotes significance at the 10% level.  
 





                                                 
1 A comprehensive record of the impacts of the European terrorists events can be found in reports of the European 
Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (May 2002, November 2005). 
 
2 In the Netherlands and Denmark, many Islamic websites were inundated with hate speech and the amount of anti-
Muslim text messages increased dramatically after 9/11. A number of opinion polls confirmed that the Danish 
majority believed that 9/11 had made them become more negative towards Muslims, where the vast majority of the 
population felt that Muslims should be made to take lessons in Danish democratic values. Denmark had national 
elections coinciding with the aftermath of 9/11 and animosity towards Muslims seemed to be visible in the political 
sphere too. Changes in attitude towards Muslims and a resulting trend of hostility were identified in the Danish 
workplaces too. Series of opinion polls in the Netherlands indicate that a large part the population was in favor of 
the deportation of Muslims whilst others were keen to see asylum seekers from Muslim backgrounds being refused 
entry to the country. Another poll declared the Dutch population's belief that Islam presented them with a very real 
threat. The killing of the author of a documentary about Muslim immigrants by a Dutch-Moroccan (November 
2004) Muslim added to the perceived danger.  
 
3 Kaestner et al. (2007) regress ―earnings‖ for employed individuals. For their ―hours-worked‖ regressions, they 
include all individuals setting hours equal to zero for men who were not employed. We do the same in the OLS 
regressions but for the quantile earning regressions, we include all men assigning log of earnings equal to zero if not 
employed. This is done to avoid the sample selection bias occurring in the mean regression. 
 
4 The recession that began in March 2001 is potentially one such confounding factor. Estimation of the pre- and 
post-9/11 changes in outcome using only the target-group (i.e. Mislims) sample may generate a negative coefficient 
simply because of the business-cycle downturn.  
 
5 To control for industry of work, 9 major industry dummy variables were used. To control for occupations we 
constructed ten major occupation groups. However, we use ―percentage of group members working in the respective 
occupation‖ to control for occupational variations instead of using occupation dummies. Exclusion of this variable 
does not significantly affect the difference in differences effect. 
 
6 We follow the specifications of Kaestner et al. (2004) here. We find coefficients of the time-trend variables always 
negligible and statistically insignificant. Models with month dummy variables yielded similar results. 
 
7 In the case of probit, the interaction effect is estimated by taking the average of difference-in-differences of the 
predicted probabilities. 
 
8 Kaestner et al. allowed the effect of September 11
th to differ according to an index of hate crime/discrimination 
against Arabs and Muslims. They used three measures of September 11th related hate crime or discrimination: 
number of hate crime/discrimination incidents reported in a state; number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per 
Arab population in a state; and number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per state population. While the first 
two capture the risk of discrimination Arabs and Muslims face in a state, the third is an indicator of the prevalence 
of prejudice among the non-Arab population. Prior to October 2001, value of hate-crime index was assumed to be 
zero in all states
8. They estimated the results using all three indices and found the effects of all of them to be 
statistically insignificant. Due to the insignificant effects and the limited nature of the data, we do not include the 
indices in the analyses. 
 
9 Unlike in the US sample, we drop men between age 55 and 64 from the UK sample for two reasons. First, unlike 
in the US, about 90 percent of the target group members are below 55 in the UK. Second, about half of the 
―Muslims‖ over the age 54 in the UK are out of labor force in contrast to less than one-third of the comparison-
group members. Questionnaires in the US and the UK surveys are similar and the data collection methods are 
comparable making it possible to use the same method to analyze both data sets. 
 
10 There has been no study on whether the 1
st generation immigrants were affected more than the 2
nd-generation 
immigrants. Anti-terrorism laws and programs targeted primarily those 1
st generation immigrants who are not US 
citizens, especially those who are not residing or working legally in the US. A fraction of the 1
st generation 
immigrants in the CPS datasets should be illegal immigrants. Demographic research suggests that at least a fraction 
of the illegal immigrants are in the CPS since the number of immigrants enumerated by the survey (and by the  
 




                                                                                                                                                             
decennial Census, upon which the CPS weights are based) exceeds estimates of the number of the foreign-born 
legally present in the U.S. 
 
11 Until Spring 2002, the UK data does not identify men who are Muslim by religious affiliation (i.e., target group 
B). Therefore, a small fraction of comparison group 2 would include UK-born Muslims. 
 
12 Consistent with the literature, we find that marriage, years in the UK, and UK citizenship is associated with higher 
earnings and employment. 
 
13 The outcomes before and after 9/11 for ―Muslims‖ age 16-54 in the UK are available upon request. 
 
14 The lower educational attainment of Muslims (compared to other immigrants) explains the largest portion of the 
employment gap. However, over 90% of the total gap remains unexplained. 
 
15 Results available from the authors on request. 
 
16 ―Rise in Muslim Discrimination‖, BBC news, 16 December 2004.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4102389.stm 
 
17 Results available from the authors on request. 
 
18 We also explored estimating median regressions that include the unemployed as having zero earnings. This was 
not feasible because more than fifty percent of the sample reported zero earnings. 
 
19 EUMAP – EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program – Aspirations and Reality: British Muslims and the Labour 
Market. 